The Announcement Effect of Cash Dividend Changes on Share Prices: An Empirical Analysis of China by Chen, Dar-hsin
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46509741
The	Announcement	Effect	of	Cash	Dividend
Changes	on	Share	Prices:	An	Empirical	Analysis
of	China
Article		in		Chinese	Economy	·	January	2009
DOI:	10.2753/CES1097-1475420103	·	Source:	RePEc
CITATIONS
9
READS
335
3	authors,	including:
Dar-Hsin	Chen
National	Taipei	University
36	PUBLICATIONS			174	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Hsiang-Hsi	Liu
National	Taipei	University
24	PUBLICATIONS			80	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
All	in-text	references	underlined	in	blue	are	linked	to	publications	on	ResearchGate,
letting	you	access	and	read	them	immediately.
Available	from:	Dar-Hsin	Chen
Retrieved	on:	20	June	2016
 
The Announcement Effect of Cash Dividend Changes on Share Prices: 
An Empirical Analysis of China 
 
Dar-Hsin Chen* 
 Department of Business Administration 
National Taipei University, Taiwan 
 
Chien-Chung Nieh  
Department of Banking and Finance 
Tamkang University, Taiwan 
 
Chun-Da Chen 
Department of Economics and Finance 
Tennessee State University, USA 
 
 
Wan-Wei Tang 
Owen Graduate School of Management 
Vanderbilt University, USA 
 
 
Last Revised: November 12, 2007 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Professor Dar-Hsin Chen, Department of Business 
Administration, National Taipei University, 151 University Rd., San Shia, Taipei 
County, 237 Taiwan.  Tel.: 886-2-8674-6578.  Fax: 886-2-8671-5912.  Email: 
dhchen@mail.ntpu.edu.tw.   
                                           1
ABSTRACT 
This paper adopts the sample of cash dividend changes from all listed A-share 
firms in China over the period 2000 to 2004 and applies an event study in order to 
investigate the announcement effect of cash dividend changes and to examine 
simultaneously if the dividend signaling hypothesis holds in China’s stock markets.  
Empirical results indicate that the announcement of cash dividend changes has a 
positive influence on share prices, but such results only partly support the dividend 
signaling hypothesis.  We also find that there is no great dissimilarity between the 
announcement effects of cash dividend changes for different stock markets in China.  
However, the announcement effect of cash dividend changes for different sample 
periods exhibits distinct differences which may have a close connection with the 
promulgation and execution of two administrative rules.  The cross sectional analysis 
also shows that both cash dividend yield and the ratio of non-floating shares have 
explanatory power on the announcement effect of cash dividend changes.  
 
Keywords: Cash dividends; Cash dividend changes; Announcement effect; Abnormal 
returns; Event study; Market model. 
JEL Classification: D21, G32, G35.  
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The Announcement Effect of Cash Dividend Changes on Share Prices: 
An Empirical Analysis of China 
 
1. Introduction 
Dividend policy has been a puzzle in corporate finance for several decades. 
Among numerous research subjects about dividend policy, the most popular one is the 
relationship between the dividend level and the share price of a firm.  According to 
the dividend discount model of Gordon (1959), it is feasible to derive that the 
dividend payment augmentation should be accompanied by the value increase in a 
firm.  Miller and Modigliani (1961), however, point out that the value of a firm is not 
influenced by current and future dividend decisions, which was well recognized as the 
dividend irrelevance theory.  Later on, several empirical studies were conducted, and 
the results were inconsistent nevertheless.  Several hypotheses were developed 
sequentially to explain the relation between a firm’s dividend policy and the price of 
its shares.  Among those hypotheses, tax effect (tax clientele effect), information 
asymmetric/dividend signaling, and agency problems are the most famous ones.  
This paper focuses on the empirical analysis of the dividend signaling hypothesis and 
investigates the announcement effect of cash dividend changes.  According to the 
dividend signaling hypothesis, cash dividends function as a good signaling vehicle of 
a firm’s future cash flow, thus implying that unanticipated dividend changes should be 
accompanied by share price changes in the same direction.  This paper tries to 
explore if this assumption holds in China. 
This empirical analysis adopts the sample of cash dividend changes from 
China-listed A-share stocks.  China is a good dividend policy research target at least 
for the following reasons.  First, most of the dividend policy research studies are 
based on the samples of free economic markets, such as the United States; fewer 
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studies are conducted with a socialistic market sample.  Different economic bodies 
may probably have dissimilar characteristics, and so it is alluring to have dividend 
policy studies made in a communistic country, such as China.  Second, dividend 
policy is hardly related to compulsive cash dividend doctrines.  Therefore, it will 
possibly be a breakthrough to perform dividend policy studies on the listed A-share 
stocks of China.  Only just a few years ago did China set compulsive enactments 
having a great influence on the cash dividend policy discretion of listed firms.  Next, 
compared to the capital markets of developed countries, China’s markets are more 
fledgling in nature.  Two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, initiated their trading in December 1990 and April 1991, 
respectively.  Both of these two stock exchanges have a much shorter operation 
history than the major stock exchanges of developed countries. 
Stock investors of China are less educated than those in developed countries.  
According to the 2005 Fact Book published by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the 
percentage of investors with a bachelor diploma or above was only 13.03%.  
Because of the short trading history and the lower education level, Chinese stock 
investors may show virtually different attitudes and behaviors toward risk-taking, 
investment, and dividend policy.  Lastly, China is showing a greater and greater 
economic influence in the integrating world nowadays.  The economic growth rate, 
current account surplus, and stock market performance of China all show strong 
growth, and as such it is worth it to learn more about China’s stock markets and the 
investor behaviors through dividend policy research studies. 
According to the results of empirical analysis, for investors, the announcement 
of a cash dividend increase is an optimistic signal about a firm’s future operation and 
cash flow, and thus a cash dividend increase is followed by positive abnormal returns.  
On the contrary, the announcement of a cash dividend decrease is a pessimistic signal, 
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and so a cash dividend decrease is followed by negative abnormal returns.  Therefore, 
the dividend signaling hypothesis is well supported by these empirical studies, and 
investors do adjust their expectation on a firm’s cash flow after cash dividend changes.  
In this paper, we wonder if the stock markets of China display the same feature and if 
any announcement effect of cash dividend changes exists.  
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the announcement effect of 
cash dividend changes on share prices with a cash dividend change sample of A-share 
listed stocks in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
Although we can obtain lots of research results from developed countries, the capital 
market of China exhibits different investor structures, regulations, and shareholder 
structures, etc.  Thus, the announcement effect of cash dividend changes in China is 
truly an important research issue.  The analysis results of this paper not only can 
provide the announcement effect of cash dividend changes from an emerging country, 
but can also serve as a good decision reference for investors and China’s government. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the 
dividend policy of listed firms in China.  Section 3 reviews the theoretical issues 
concerning dividend policy and value of a firm.  Section 4 describes data sources 
and research methodology.  Section 5 presents the empirical findings.  Section 6 
summarizes the results of this study and offers some concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Dividend Policy of Listed Firms in China 
There are three kinds of dividend policy for listed firms in China to choose.  
The first one is “the bonus share” (hereinafter referred to as the “BS”) that is 
generally known as stock dividends.  In fact, the BS simply transfers a portion of 
retained earnings to contributed capital.  The second one is “the transference of 
additional paid-in capital to contributed capital” (hereinafter referred to as the “TA”).  
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As its name implies, the TA simply transfers a portion of additional paid-in capital to 
contributed capital.  The last one is cash dividends.  Both the BS and the TA simply 
affect the relative components of equity.  On the contrary, cash dividends have a 
direct and practical influence on a firm’s long-run operation than the BS and the TA 
do. 
     Fama and French (2001) point out that, regardless of the earning level, the 
proportion of all listed firms in the U.S. that paid cash dividends has fallen 
dramatically from 80% to 20% during the period of the 1960s to 1990s.  Publicly 
traded firms in China echoed this “dividend-disappearing trend” mentioned in Fama 
and French (2001) over the 1990s.  The ratio of cash dividend paying firms fell from 
97.3% in 1993 to 36.8% in 1999.  Nevertheless, the proportion of cash dividend 
paying firms rebounded greatly in 2000. 
It would be intuitional to attribute this dramatic change to the announcement of 
two administrative rules about new share offerings on March 28 and May 11, 2001.  
First, “Administration Rules for New Shares Offering of the Listed Firms” were 
declared on March 28, 2001.  The rules require the lead underwriter to mark out in 
the underwriting investigation reports any firm that did not have any cash dividend in 
the past three years and any firm’s board of directors who did not reasonably explain 
why they do not pay cash dividends.  Afterward, on May 11, 2001, “The Public 
Offering Review Committee of China Securities Regulatory Commission Concerning 
Guidance on New Shares Offering Check and Commission of Listed Firms” was 
declared and executed.  It demands the Public Offering Review Committee to 
concentrate on the circumstances of a firm’s cash dividend payment in the past three 
years, and to decide independently if such a circumstance will affect the new share 
offering of a listed firm when the committee is checking and admitting the new share 
offering application from this listed firm. 
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Although both rules do not explicitly forbid those firms that do not pay cash 
dividends from offering new shares, its rational is for managers in publicly traded 
firms to figure out that these two rules are set up to implicitly require listed firms to 
pay cash back to shareholders so as to strengthen the shareholder protection.  The 
Government hopes the listed firms retain less cash flow and to return the cash to their 
shareholders.  Thus, managers in publicly traded firms should strike a balance 
between an absence of financial flexibility in raising funds by issuing new shares and 
a shortage of funds for further growth resulting from distributing cash out.  Once the 
firms pay cash dividends to obtain long-run financial flexibility for issuing new shares, 
a short-run financial resource (cash dividend payment) is the sacrifice.  These two 
rules are not really adequate, because the firms that pay cash dividends to get the 
chance of offering new shares to raise funds may possibly be the ones deficient in 
money.  The long-term prospect of a firm may possibly be harmed if managers are 
obedient to these two regulatory rules.  However, as the proportion of the firms 
paying cash dividends has sky-rocketed, most managers have chosen to resign 
themselves to these two rules. 
Listed firms in China have a unique share structure.  The share structure of a 
listed firm in China is divided into two parts:  one is floating shares, and the other is 
non-floating shares.  This separation of share structure is known as “the Split Share 
Structure”.  The Split Share Structure has several features.  First, non-floating 
shares are non-tradable in capital markets, but floating shares are tradable.  In other 
words, the incomes of non-floating shareholders come only from cash dividends, but 
floating shareholders can profit both through capital gains and cash dividends.  Next, 
the non-floating shares are usually held by issuers of firms, the institutional investors, 
and the Chinese government, but the floating shares are held by the public. 
The proportion of non-floating shares is much higher than that of floating 
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shares.  In fact, according to the share structure data from the website of China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the average proportion of non-floating shares for 
all publicly traded firms is always higher than 60%.  Thus, the board of directors is 
usually dominated by non-floating shareholders.  Finally, the holding cost of 
non-floating shareholders approximates the par value (RMB 1) which is much lower 
than that of floating-share investors. 
The existence of the Split Share Structure leads to severe corporate governance 
problems.  With a view to carrying out “the Guidelines on Promoting Reform, 
Opening-up and Steady Development of China's Capital Market”, floating the 
non-floating shares of A-share listed companies, balancing the interests of 
shareholders, and addressing the problem of listed companies’ split share structure, 
“the Pilot Reform of Listed Companies Split Share Structure” was formally initiated 
in 2005.  Before the reform of the share structure of listed firms is completed, the 
controlling non-floating shareholders may distribute cash dividends to themselves.  
The reason why they tend to do so is as follows.  First, because of the relatively 
lower holding costs, the cash dividend distribution will benefit the non-floating 
shareholders with a much higher cash dividend yield.  Second, the cash dividend 
payment is the only method for which non-floating shareholders can realize incomes.  
To sum up, we think that the controlling shareholders (usually non-floating 
shareholders) may make dividend policy decisions that hurt the maximum interest of 
floating shareholders. 
 
3. Literature Review 
Dividend policy has been a popular subject in financial studies, especially the 
relation between dividend policy and the value of a firm.  Gordon (1959) provides a 
valuation approach of firms which is to discount the dividend streams.  According to 
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his argument, we may easily derive that the more cash dividends a firm pays, the 
more valuable the firm should be.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) conclude that what 
really counts about the valuation of a firm are net profits and investments under ideal 
economic assumptions and the value of a firm is irrelevant with its dividend policy.  
An ideal economy, however, hardly exists in the real world, and the market 
imperfections are just the normality.  The payout literature following that of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) tries to justify the value premium relating to the dividend 
decision after dropping the ideal economic assumption with different perspectives.  
Among them, one of the theoretical assumptions is the most famous of all:  
information asymmetric/dividend signaling. 
Information asymmetric and signaling hypotheses together explain the dividend 
policy rationally.  When asymmetric information exists between the insiders and 
outsiders of a firm - insiders know more information including future cash flow about 
the firm than outsiders - cash dividends might be a costly vehicle to convey a firm’s 
future prospects that are unknown to the market and may alter market perceptions 
about the firm’s future earnings. 
Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) develop a two-period model.  
Both of their models conclude that it is unwise for bad-prospect firms to commit high 
level dividends, and only good-prospect firms can commit high level dividends 
without hurting long-term operations.  Asymmetric information and signaling 
hypotheses contain an important implication - that is, unanticipated dividend changes 
should be accompanied by stock price changes in the same direction.  This 
implication has been tested empirically.   
The following research results support the assertion that dividend changes 
should be followed by stock price changes in the same direction.  Pettit (1972) finds 
that a significant price increase follows announcements of dividend increases, and a 
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significant price drop follows the announcement of cash dividend decreases whether 
the earnings performance was positive or negative.  Similarly, Aharony and Swary 
(1980) discover that shareholders of firms announcing cash dividend increases realize 
positive abnormal returns and shareholders of firms decreasing cash dividends 
sustained negative abnormal returns during the 20 days surrounding the 
announcement day.  Divecha and Morse (1983) show that the announcement effect 
of the cash dividend increases is positive.  Moreover, Grullon, Michaely, and 
Swaminathan (2002) summarize that the average 3-day abnormal return around a 
dividend-increase announcement is 1.34%, and the average 3-day abnormal return 
around a dividend-decrease announcement is –3.71%.  When it comes to the extreme 
dividend changes that are referred to as dividend initiations and dividend omissions, 
the research results of Asquith and Mullins (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), and 
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) indicate that stock prices react positively with 
dividend initiations and negatively with dividend decreases. 
All of the findings of capital market reactions to dividend change announcements 
mentioned above do support the signaling hypothesis - namely, that unanticipated 
dividend changes provide information about shifts in management’s assessment of a 
firm’s future operational prospects, and unanticipated dividend changes are 
accompanied by stock price changes in the same direction.  Since the investors do 
not know the current and future levels of earnings, higher-than-anticipated earnings 
signaled by high dividends would lead to a positive stock price increase. 
 
4. Data Sources and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
Our sample is drawn from all A-share firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange that have cash dividend announcements 
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over the period 2000 through 2004.  The sample firms’ cash dividend announcement 
information, financial data, share structure data, and trading data are obtained from 
CSMAR (China Stock Market Accounting Research) which is provided by the GTA 
Information Technology Limited Company.  To be included in the sample, each 
observation must satisfy the following criteria. 
a) The listed firms should not be financial firms. 
b) The so-called cash dividend announcements should be purely annual cash dividend 
announcements.  In other words, firms with announcements of mid-term cash 
dividends and cash dividend announcements together with BS or TA are excluded. 
Thus, the price impact of purely annual cash dividend changes can be 
unambiguously examined. 
c) The firm with a purely annual cash dividend announcement should also have a 
purely annual cash dividend announcement the previous year. 
d) The firms should have trading data on the formal cash dividend declaration day. 
e) The sample firms of cash dividend increases are firms with higher pure cash 
dividends per share comparing to those of the previous year.  The sample firms of 
cash dividend decreases are firms with lower pure cash dividends per share 
comparing to those of the previous year. 
The final dataset contains 460 firms with announcements of cash dividend 
increases and 422 firms with announcements of cash dividend decreases.  For the 
460 cash dividend increasing firms, 287 firms are drawn from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, and 173 firms are drawn from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  For 422 
cash dividend decreasing firms, 253 firms are drawn from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, and 169 firms are from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
4.2. Research Methodology 
An event study is adopted to investigate the announcement effect of cash 
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dividend changes on share prices.  The market model is then applied to estimate the 
abnormal returns of sample firms for different event windows.  The market model 
argues that a linear relationship holds between the return of the individual security 
and the return of the market, or: 
itmt11it εRβαR ++= ,        t = -120, -119, ……., -21,              (1) 
where Rit is the daily return of the ith security at day t, Rmt is the daily return of the 
market at day t, and εit is a random error term incorporating the effect of factors that 
affect only the ith security.   
In this paper, day 0 is selected as “the public declaration day of dividends 
distribution scheme”.1  There are two main reasons why we define the event day in 
this way.  First, although in China the amount and type of dividends distribution as 
well as last year’s earnings are declared on the shareholders’ meeting which is always 
at least one day and even two months earlier than the public declaration day of 
dividends distribution scheme, the timing of actual dividend payment is still not 
decided on the shareholders’ meeting.  “The public declaration of dividends 
distribution scheme” which is announced later gives the exact information on record 
day, ex-dividend day, and the actual dividend payment day and those days generally 
take place 7 to 10 days right after the public declaration of dividends distribution 
scheme.   
Second, in China the public declaration days of dividends distribution scheme 
of publicly traded firms are usually concentrated on June and July.  However, the 
deadline for the announcement of last year’s earnings is April 30.  The impact of 
earnings announcement should have already reflected on share prices by the end of 
April.  Therefore, the adoption of the public declaration day of dividends distribution 
                                                 
1 We have tried to employ the next day of shareholders’ meeting day as the event day.  However, the 
results are not significant and so are not reported.   
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scheme as the event day can avoid the compounding interference of earnings 
announcement on the announcement effect of dividend changes. 
For each security a maximum of 141 daily return observations for the period 
around its respective event is used, starting at day -120 and ending at day +20 relative 
to the event.  The first 100 days in this period (-120 through -21) are designated the 
“estimation window”, and the following 41 days (-20 through + 20) are designated the 
“event window”.  
The right-hand side of the first two terms of Equation (1) supplies a conditional 
expected return for the ith security.  In other words, we may use the OLS value of 
αˆ  and βˆ  in Equation (1) from the estimation window to estimate the conditional 
expected returns for the individual security in the event window.  The difference 
between the real return in day t and the conditional expected return in day t is given 
by: 
)ˆˆ( 11 mtitit RR βαδ +−= ,         t = -20, -19, ……., 20.             (2) 
Here, itδ  serves as a measure of the risk-adjusted abnormal returns of the security in 
the event window.  The cross-sectional average abnormal returns for day t are 
defined as: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧= ∑
=
N
i
ittAR
1
δ / N,           t = -20, -19, ……., 20,                (3) 
where N is the number of sample observations.  The cumulative abnormal returns 
from day t1 through day t2, CART, are: 
∑
=
= 2
1
t
tt
tT ARCAR .                                                (4) 
As for the test of significance of average abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns, two methods are adopted.  One is the ordinary cross-sectional 
method.  The other is the standardized residual cross-sectional method which is 
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introduced by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991).  The t-value formulae of the 
ordinary cross-sectional method and the standardized residual cross-sectional method 
to test the significance of average abnormal returns are illustrated as: 
∑ ∑
∑
= =
=
−−
=
N
i
N
i
ie
ie
N
i
ie
AR
OCSM
N
ARAR
NN
AR
Nt
1 1
1
)(
)1(
1
1
,                            (5) 
where ARie is the average abnormal return of ith observation on one certain day in the 
event window, and: 
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,                         (6) 
where SARie is the standardized average abnormal return of ith observation on one 
certain day in the event window.  Similarly, the t-value formulae of the ordinary 
cross-sectional method and the standardized residual cross-sectional method to test 
the significance of cumulative abnormal returns are done by substituting the ARie and 
SARie with CARi(T1,T2) and SCARi(T1,T2) in Equation (5) and Equation (6), 
respectively. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Announcement Effect of Cash Dividend Changes on Share Prices 
To assess the effect of cash dividend changes on the share prices, we collect a 
sample consisting of firms that changed their cash dividends during the period 2000 to 
2004.  Each observation in the sample satisfies the criteria mentioned in Part 4.  
The resulting sample contains 422 announcements of cash dividend decreases and 460 
announcements of cash dividend increases. 
Table 1 presents the results of this analysis.  For the cash dividend increase 
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sample, there are 16 negative-abnormal-return trading days and only 3 positive- 
abnormal-return trading days in the 20 days preceding the declaration of cash 
dividend increases.  For the cash dividend decrease sample, there are 13 negative- 
abnormal-return trading days and only 4 positive-abnormal-return trading days in the 
20 days preceding the declaration of cash dividend decreases.  Thus, the stock prices 
tend to perform poorly before the announcement of cash dividend changes.  The 
20-day cumulative abnormal return before the announcement of cash dividend 
changes is a negative 0.65% for cash dividend decreasing firms and is a significantly 
negative 0.75% for dividend increasing firms. 
For the increasing cash dividend sample, the abnormal return is a significantly 
positive 0.23% at the day of a positive dividend change announcement.  The 
abnormal returns of the 8 days succeeding the announcement of cash dividend 
increases are all positive, and four of them are even significant.  Most of the 
abnormal returns of the 20 days after the cash dividend increase announcement are 
positive.  As a result, the cumulative abnormal return starts rebounding at the day of 
declaration. 
For the decreasing cash dividend sample, the abnormal return is negative at the 
announcing date, but it is not significant.  There are 13 positive-abnormal-return 
trading days and 6 negative-abnormal-return trading days in the 20 days after the 
announcement of the cash dividend decreases.  Therefore, whether the cash dividend 
increases or decreases, the share prices are inclined to perform better after the 
announcement of dividend changes.  Cash dividend changes have a positive 
influence on the share prices. 
Figure 1 provides the graph of cumulative abnormal returns on days 
surrounding the announcement of cash dividend changes.  Figure 1 shows that stock 
prices perform poorly before the announcement, but perform well after the 
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announcement.  Thus, Figure 1 echoes the viewpoints we have briefly concluded in 
the last paragraph. 
In short, the empirical results only partly support the dividend signaling 
hypothesis.  The analysis results of the increasing cash dividend sample are 
consistent with the empirical implication of the signaling hypothesis, and the cash 
dividend increases are accompanied by the stock prices moving in the same direction.  
However, the empirical results of the decreasing cash dividend sample do not comply 
with the signaling hypothesis, and the cash dividend decreases are accompanied by 
the stock prices moving in the opposite direction.  Therefore, it is feasible to 
conclude that investors in China respond positively to the cash dividend 
announcement whether it is increasing or decreasing.  In other words, cash dividends 
are welcome in China nowadays according to the results of our analysis. 
5.2. Price Impact of Cash Dividend Changes on Different Markets 
After assessing the effect of cash dividend changes on the market price, we try 
to compare the price impact of cash dividend changes on different markets.  China 
has only two stock exchanges, one is the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the other is 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  The sample firms are all collected from the listed 
firms of these two exchanges.  For the 460 increasing cash dividend firms, 287 firms 
are drawn from the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 173 firms are drawn from the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  For the 422 decreasing cash dividend firms, 253 firms 
are drawn from the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 169 firms are from the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange.  The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 2, and Table 
3. 
For the increasing cash dividend sample, most abnormal returns preceding the 
cash dividend change declaration are negative both for the Shanghai subsample and 
the Shenzhen subsample, but the negative abnormal returns of the Shenzhen 
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subsample are more intense than that of the Shanghai subsample.  On the day of 
dividend increase announcement, significantly positive abnormal returns occur for 
both subsamples.  After the cash dividend increase announcement, the cumulative 
abnormal returns of both markets exhibit upward-moving trends.  On the other hand, 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the Shenzhen subsample increase more fiercely 
than that of the Shanghai subsample in a shorter time period, but the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the Shanghai subsample increase more steadily than that of the 
Shenzhen subsample in a longer time period.  Generally speaking, although the 
overall abnormal return features of the Shanghai subsample and the Shenzhen 
subsample are slightly different, they are roughly the same with the pattern of full 
cash dividend increase sample as explained in Section 5.1. 
For the cash dividend decrease case, the abnormal return pattern of the 
Shanghai subsample has a distinct difference from that of the Shenzhen subsample - 
that is, most of the abnormal returns of the Shenzhen subsample are negative before 
the announcement of the cash dividend decrease, but the abnormal returns of the 
Shanghai subsample show a comparatively positive performance before the 
announcement of cash dividend decrease.  On the day of cash dividend decrease 
declaration, the abnormal return of the Shanghai subsample is negative, but that of the 
Shanghai subsample is zero.  After the announcement of cash dividend decreases, 
the cumulative abnormal returns of both markets display upward-moving trends. 
We thus conclude that, on the whole, the announcement effect of cash dividend 
changes is positive for both markets, and there is no great difference between the 
announcement effects of the two markets.  
5.3. Announcement Effect of Different Sample Period 
The empirical results from above are completely derived from the sample of the 
period 2000-04.  We wonder whether the announcement effect of a dividend change 
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on share prices alters with time.  Hence, we analyze the announcement effect with 
the sample year 1999 and cash dividend changes.  The announcement effect of cash 
dividend changes in 1999 is quite important, because it provides the announcement 
effect of a quite different cash dividend distribution situation.  We have pointed out 
that, in 1999, the ratio of cash-dividend-paying firms was low (36.78%) and the rules 
which severely influence the cash dividend payment decision were not promulgated 
then.  Nevertheless, in 2001 the rules compelling listed firms to distribute cash 
dividends were announced and executed, and the ratio of cash-dividend-paying firms 
increased dramatically.  
Figure 2 and Table 4 present the results of this analysis.  Figure 2 and Table 4 
clearly show the facts that the announcement effect of a cash dividend decrease is 
significantly positive, and the announcement effect of a cash dividend increase is 
insignificantly negative.  The absolute value of cumulative abnormal returns for (0, 
20) the event window of the 1999 sample is more than that of the 2000-04 sample.  
These empirical results are not only totally opposed to the dividend signaling 
hypothesis, but are also different from the analysis findings we got from 2000-04 
dividend change sample.  
The announcement effects of dividend changes before and after year 2000 
present an immense variation.  We think the promulgation and execution of two 
administrative rules may reasonably explain the variation.  Before these two laws 
were declared, the ratio of cash-dividend-paying firms was lower, and capital gains 
were the main source of income for investors.  Therefore, investors may look down 
upon cash dividends and react negatively to cash dividend increases and positively to 
cash dividend decreases.  However, when the ratio of cash-dividend-paying firms 
increased sharply after these two rules were announced, except for capital gains, cash 
dividends became another major source of income.  Thus, investors’ attitudes 
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towards cash dividends may become positive, and react positively to all 
cash-dividend-paying firms.  
5.4. Affecting Factors Analysis of the Announcement Effect 
To further investigate factors that may affect the market reaction around the 
announcement of cash dividend changes, we estimate the following cross sectional 
regression using the OLS regression methodology: 
+++++++= ititititititit DEBTPBASSETSDPDYDCCAR 6543210 βββββββ  
itititit NFROATATR εβββ +++ 987 ,                                  (7) 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns for different event windows around 
the announcement of the dividend changes; DC is the percentage change in the cash 
dividend payment; DY is the dividend yield at the time of the announcement of the 
cash dividend changes; DP is the dividend payout ratio (cash dividend per share / 
earnings per share); ASSETS is the logarithm of the book value of the total assets at 
the time of the announcement of the cash dividend changes; P/B is the price-to-book 
ratio at the end of the year; DEBT is the debt ratio ( book value of total liabilities / 
book value of total assets); TATR is the total assets turnover rate; ROA is the return 
on assets; NF is proportion of non-floating shares. Table 5 summarizes the 
investigation results.   
Table 5 indicates that only four financial variables have a significant impact on 
the announcement effect of cash dividend changes.  First, dividend yield has a 
significantly positive relation with CAR, but the significance disappears gradually 
with the time interval extension of event windows. In other words, the high dividend 
yield stocks are inclined to perform better than the low dividend yield ones.  Next, 
for the event window of a longer time interval, P/B has a significantly negative impact 
on cumulative abnormal returns.  In other words, value-oriented (low P/B) firms tend 
to have higher cumulative abnormal returns in a longer time interval, and the intrinsic 
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value of a firm may be reflected on the longer cumulative abnormal returns.  Third, 
market investors react positively to the profit index ROA for the (0, 10) event window, 
but the significance of this positive connection disappears with the extension or 
curtailment of the event window.  Fourth, the ratio of non-floating shares has a 
negative impact on the cumulative abnormal returns of (0, 3), (0, 5) event windows.  
We have concluded that non-floating shareholders usually occupy the majority of the 
shareholder structure and dominate the board of directors.  Because the holding costs 
of non-floating shareholders are lower (dividend yields are higher), and the dividend 
distribution is the only mechanism they can realize incomes, the controlling 
shareholders (usually non-floating shareholders) may make an over-lavish cash 
dividend policy that hurts the interest of floating shareholders.  Therefore, the 
negative relation between the ratio of non-floating shares and cumulative abnormal 
returns does make great sense.  
 
6. Conclusions and Summary 
This paper adopts a sample of cash dividend changes from all listed A-share 
firms in China over the period 2000 to 2004 and applies an event study in order to 
investigate the impact of cash dividend changes on share prices and to examine 
simultaneously if the dividend signaling hypothesis holds in China’s stock markets.  
We find that the cash dividend changes do have a considerable influence on share 
prices.  The share prices react significantly positive to both cash dividend increases 
and cash dividend decreases.  The result only half supports the signaling hypothesis.  
In fact, only the positive announcement effect for cash dividend increases fits the 
dividend signaling hypothesis.  Cash dividend decreases, on the other hand, also 
have a positive announcement effect.  Such a market reaction to dividend changes 
implies that cash dividends are welcome whether they are cash dividend increases or 
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cash dividend decreases. 
The announcement effect of cash dividend changes is positive for the sample of 
different stock exchanges, but the significance alters with sources of the sample and 
the event window selection.  Therefore, there is no great dissimilarity between the 
announcement effect of cash dividend changes for different markets in China.  
However, the empirical result of the 1999 cash dividend change sample reveals that 
the cash dividend changes are accompanied by stock price changes in the opposite 
direction.  This analysis result is completely opposite to the dividend signaling 
hypothesis and also different from that of the 2000-2004 cash dividend change sample.  
Such result implies that investors react pessimistically to cash dividend increases and 
react optimistically to cash dividend decreases.  Therefore, investors may have a 
negative point of view on cash dividends in 1999.  However, when the ratio of 
cash-dividend-paying firms increased sharply after two rules we mention above were 
announced, cash dividends became a major source of income.  Investors’ attitudes 
towards cash dividends may turn positive, and react positively to all 
cash-dividend-paying firms.  In short, the announcement effect of cash dividend 
changes and investors’ attitude toward cash dividend changes may shift with time. 
We further investigate factors which may probably have a close connection with 
the cumulative abnormal returns.  We find that the dividend yield has a significantly 
positive relationship with short-term cumulative abnormal returns, but the 
significance disappears with the prolongation of event window for cumulative 
abnormal returns.  Thus, high-dividend-yield stocks are inclined to experience higher 
positive abnormal returns.  The ratio of non-floating shares, however, has a 
significantly negative connection with short-term cumulative abnormal returns.  In 
other words, the existence of the Split Share Structure does have an undesirable 
influence on cash dividends.  We expect that the implementation of “the Pilot 
Reform of Listed Companies Split Share Structure” not only can float the non-floating 
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shares of A-share listed firms, but can also partly eliminate the negative impact of 
non-floating shares on cash dividend declaration. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormal Return on Days Surrounding the 
Announcement of Cash Dividend Changes 
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 Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Return on Days Surrounding the 
Announcement of Cash Dividend Changes: Evidence of Year 1999 
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Table 1. Effect of Dividend Changes on the Market Price 
This table examines the effect of dividend changes on the market price for stocks that change their 
dividends during the period 2000 to 2004. Each observation in the sample satisfies the criteria 
mentioned in Data Sources and Sample Selection. AR is the average abnormal return surrounding 
announcements of cash dividend changes. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return on days surrounding 
the announcement of cash dividend changes. T is the t-value of the ordinary cross-sectional method. Z 
is the t-value of standardized residual cross-sectional method. 
Panel A: Cash Dividend Increases Panel B: Cash Dividend Decreases 
Day AR 
(%) 
T 
(AR) 
Z 
(AR) 
 
 
CAR 
(%) 
T 
(CAR)
Z 
(CAR)
AR
(%)
T 
(AR)
Z 
(AR)
 
 
CAR 
(%) 
T 
(CAR) 
Z 
(CAR)
-10 -0.09 -1.08  -0.81   -0.40 -1.52 -0.98 -0.02 -0.32 -0.12  -0.23 -0.70  -0.04 
-9 -0.02 -0.22  0.05   -0.42 -1.52 -0.93 -0.08 -1.01 -0.72  -0.31 -0.89  -0.22 
-8 -0.06 -0.76  -0.05   -0.47 -1.64 -0.89 -0.05 -0.70 -0.83  -0.36 -0.98  -0.41 
-7 -0.05 -0.76  -0.57   -0.53 -1.74 -0.98 -0.15 -2.04* -2.06*  -0.51 -1.30  -0.83 
-6 -0.05 -0.70  -0.55   -0.58 -1.84 -1.09 0.06 0.66 0.66  -0.45 -1.09  -0.64 
-5 -0.03 -0.42  -0.76   -0.61 -1.89 -1.25 -0.01 -0.21 0.01  -0.46 -1.08  -0.60 
-4 -0.04 -0.50  -0.89   -0.65 -1.94 -1.43 -0.06 -0.70 -0.19  -0.52 -1.15  -0.61 
-3 -0.09 -1.29  -1.22   -0.74 -2.13* -1.64 -0.03 -0.47 -0.65  -0.55 -1.20  -0.69 
-2 -0.03 -0.37  0.11   -0.77 -2.16* -1.58 -0.09 -1.18 -1.17  -0.65 -1.34  -0.85 
-1 0.01 0.16  -0.26   -0.75 -2.13* -1.64 0.00 -0.06 -0.02  -0.65 -1.29  -0.80 
0 0.23 3.05** 3.66***  -0.52 -1.46 -0.80 -0.06 -0.79 -0.39  -0.71 -1.36  -0.83 
1 0.14 2.12* 2.22*  -0.38 -1.03 -0.38 0.04 0.51 1.15  -0.66 -1.27  -0.63 
2 0.16 2.39* 2.80**  -0.22 -0.59 0.12 0.03 0.39 0.40  -0.64 -1.18  -0.57 
3 0.19 2.77** 2.69**  -0.04 -0.09 0.57 0.06 0.84 1.25  -0.57 -1.02  -0.38 
4 0.06 0.75  0.63   0.02 0.05 0.70 0.07 0.95 1.37  -0.50 -0.86  -0.19 
5 0.04 0.50  0.28   0.06 0.14 0.72 0.07 0.88 1.21  -0.43 -0.72  -0.02 
6 0.08 1.22  1.53   0.14 0.35 0.98 0.17 2.48* 2.23*  -0.25 -0.42  0.24 
7 0.18 2.80** 2.87**  0.32 0.78 1.41 0.15 2.01* 2.08*  -0.11 -0.17  0.50 
8 0.05 0.71  0.65   0.38 0.88 1.48 0.06 0.77 1.02  -0.05 -0.08  0.61 
9 -0.04 -0.50  0.13   0.34 0.78 1.48 0.04 0.56 0.87  -0.01 -0.01  0.69 
10 -0.02 -0.23  0.19   0.32 0.71 1.46 -0.14 -1.61 -1.10  -0.14 -0.22  0.54 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
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Table 2. Effect of Dividend Changes on the Market Price for Different Markets 
This table examines the effect of dividend changes on the market price for stocks listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange that change their dividends during the 
period 2000 to 2004. Each observation in the sample satisfies the criteria mentioned in Data Sources 
and Sample Selection. AR is the average abnormal return surrounding announcements of cash dividend 
changes. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return on days surrounding the announcement of cash 
dividend changes. T is the t-value of the ordinary cross-sectional method. Z is the t-value of 
standardized residual cross-sectional method. 
Panel A: Cash Dividend Increase Panel B: Cash Dividend Decrease 
Shanghai  Shenzhen Shanghai Shenzhen Day 
AR 
(%) 
T 
(AR) 
Z 
(AR) 
 
AR 
(%) 
T 
(AR)
Z 
(AR)
AR
(%)
T 
(AR)
Z 
(AR)
AR 
(%) 
T 
(AR) 
Z 
(AR)
-10 -0.06 -0.57  -0.24   -0.13 -1.10 -1.09 0.05 0.52 0.60 -0.13 -0.97  -0.75 
-9 -0.09 -0.81  -0.34   0.10 0.89 0.63 -0.14 -1.55 -1.36 0.02 0.14  0.25 
-8 -0.05 -0.56  -0.36   -0.07 -0.51 0.28 -0.05 -0.47 -0.55 -0.06 -0.53  -0.62 
-7 -0.09 -1.06  -1.26   0.01 0.04 0.51 -0.05 -0.53 -0.74 -0.29 -2.49* -2.26*
-6 -0.03 -0.28  -0.27   -0.09 -0.77 -0.54 0.11 0.97 0.74 -0.03 -0.22  0.12 
-5 0.01 0.18  -0.18   -0.11 -0.78 -0.92 0.04 0.44 0.82 -0.09 -0.87  -0.90 
-4 -0.01 -0.08  -0.41   -0.08 -0.71 -0.90 -0.11 -1.11 -0.67 0.03 0.23  0.45 
-3 -0.04 -0.40  -0.42   -0.19 -1.71 -1.63 -0.03 -0.33 -0.33 -0.04 -0.34  -0.62 
-2 0.02 0.22  0.92   -0.11 -1.02 -1.08 -0.04 -0.42 -0.51 -0.17 -1.30  -1.18 
-1 -0.07 -0.78  -0.83   0.14 1.26 0.65 0.14 1.58 1.83 -0.22 -2.15* -2.19*
0 0.25 2.80**  3.15**  0.21 1.48 1.99* -0.09 -1.09 -0.67 0.00 -0.01  0.10 
1 0.24 2.72**  2.59**  -0.01 -0.12 0.19 0.08 0.78 1.09 -0.02 -0.15  0.44 
2 0.10 1.24  1.49   0.25 2.21* 2.55* 0.02 0.24 0.35 0.04 0.32  0.21 
3 0.10 1.19  1.01   0.34 2.87** 2.97** 0.14 1.48 1.66 -0.05 -0.41  0.03 
4 -0.06 -0.59  -0.75   0.24 1.88 2.00* -0.08 -0.93 -0.93 0.30 2.27* 2.86**
5 -0.01 -0.07  -0.13   0.11 0.86 0.55 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.16 1.19  1.62 
6 0.13 1.47  1.90  0.01 0.11 0.14 0.21 2.22* 1.92 0.12 1.16  1.17 
7 0.32 3.69***  3.78***  -0.05 -0.56 -0.61 0.23 2.30* 2.27* 0.02 0.20  0.24 
8 0.16 1.58  1.39   -0.12 -1.25 -1.06 0.12 1.09 1.36 -0.03 -0.31  -0.21 
9 -0.03 -0.35  0.12   -0.04 -0.38 0.04 0.12 1.29 1.41 -0.08 -0.69  -0.30 
10 -0.01 -0.10  0.13   -0.03 -0.26 0.14 -0.08 -0.74 -0.07 -0.22 -1.64  -1.75 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Different Event Windows for 
Different Markets 
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns of different event windows for stocks listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange that change their dividends during the 
period 2000 to 2004. Each observation in the sample satisfies the criteria mentioned in Data Sources 
and Sample Selection. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return on days surrounding the announcement 
of cash dividend changes. T is the t-value of the ordinary cross-sectional method. Z is the t-value of 
standardized residual cross-sectional method. 
Shanghai Cash  
Dividend Increase  
Shenzhen Cash  
Dividend Increase 
Shanghai Cash 
Dividend Decrease  
Shenzhen Cash 
Dividend DecreaseEvent 
Window CAR 
(%) 
T 
(CAR) 
Z 
(CAR)  
CAR
(%)
T 
(CAR)
Z 
(CAR)
CAR
(%)
T 
(CAR)
Z 
(CAR) 
 
 
CAR 
(%) 
T 
(CAR)
Z 
(CAR)
(-20,0) -0.28 -0.62  -0.27   -0.93 -1.54  -0.93  0.26 0.53 0.96   -2.15 -2.03* -1.64 
(-10,0) -0.14 -0.47  -0.09   -0.32 -0.83  -0.49  -0.17 -0.54 -0.33   -0.98 -1.33 -1.08 
(-5,0) 0.17 0.83  0.98   -0.14 -0.48  -0.59  -0.10 -0.44 0.06   -0.49 -1.17 -1.04 
(-3,0) 0.16 0.97  1.56   0.05 0.23  0.28  -0.03 -0.14 0.08   -0.42 -1.36 -1.33 
(-1,0) 0.20 1.36  2.10*  0.24 1.17  1.06  0.05 0.36 0.81   -0.22 -1.22 -1.16 
(-2,0) 0.18 1.57  1.93  0.35 1.93  1.91 0.01 0.04 0.31   -0.38 -1.54 -1.40 
(0,+1) 0.49 3.98*** 4.23***  0.19 1.12  1.81 -0.01 -0.09 0.51   -0.02 -0.13 0.47 
(0,+2) 0.58 4.02*** 4.34***  0.45 1.99* 2.75** 0.01 0.06 0.65   0.02 0.10 0.46 
(0,+3) 0.68 3.97*** 4.25***  0.78 2.75** 3.56*** 0.15 0.85 1.41   -0.03 -0.12 0.35 
(0,+5) 0.62 3.02** 3.07**  1.14 3.70*** 4.40*** 0.08 0.38 0.90   0.43 1.14 1.91 
(0,+10) 1.18 3.81*** 4.08***  0.90 2.28* 2.86** 0.68 2.04* 2.71**  0.25 0.50 1.20 
(0,+20) 1.32 3.15** 3.77***  1.08 1.67  2.50* 0.25 0.52 1.31   0.47 0.73 1.52 
(-1,+1) 0.42 2.88** 3.02**  0.33 1.66  1.87 0.13 0.76 1.30   -0.24 -1.32 -0.90 
(-3,+3) 0.59 2.61** 3.11**  0.63 1.88  2.22* 0.21 0.90 1.31   -0.45 -1.08 -0.81 
(-10,+10) 0.79 1.80  2.30*  0.38 0.64  1.08  0.60 1.28 1.77  -0.74 -0.71 -0.30 
(-20,+20) 0.80 1.31  1.90  -0.05 -0.05  0.77  0.60 0.87 1.68  -1.69 -1.16 -0.59 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
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Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Different Event Windows: Evidence 
of Year 1999 
Cash Dividend Increase Cash Dividend Decrease Event 
Windows CAR T(CAR) Z(CAR) CAR T(CAR) Z(CAR) 
(-20,0) -3.32% -1.80 -1.38  0.44% 0.26  1.14  
(-10,0) -2.08% -1.54 -1.32  -0.13% -0.11  0.32  
(-5,0) -1.27% -1.23 -1.02  -0.13% -0.16  0.30  
(-3,0) -1.64% -1.37 -1.40  0.65% 0.92  1.36  
(-2,0) -1.19% -1.27 -1.20  0.55% 0.98  1.47  
(-1,0) -0.75% -1.09 -1.00  0.62% 1.22  1.61  
(0,+1) -0.21% -0.30 0.15  0.73% 1.35  1.80 
(0,+2) -0.18% -0.22 0.22  1.06% 1.46  1.95 
(0,+3) -0.27% -0.31 0.21  1.06% 1.41  1.79 
(0,+5) 0.09% 0.10 0.75  1.99% 1.75  2.03* 
(0,+10) -1.15% -0.84 -0.26  1.98% 1.31  1.83 
(0,+20) -1.40% -0.67 0.04  2.16% 1.14  1.64  
(-1,+1) -0.81% -0.95 -0.51  1.16% 1.81  2.40* 
(-3,+3) -1.75% -1.19 -0.91  1.51% 1.50  2.07* 
(-10,+10) -3.08% -1.51 -0.98  1.65% 0.84  1.56  
(-20,+20) -4.56% -1.39 -0.69  2.40% 0.83  1.63  
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
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Table 5. Effect of Cash Dividend Changes on the Share Prices: A Multivariate 
Analysis 
This table reports the average estimated coefficients of the following cross-sectional regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8it it it it it it it it itCAR DC DY DP SIZE PB DEBT TATR ROAβ β β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + + +
9 it itNFβ ε+ . 
The sample consists of stocks that change their cash dividends during the period 2000 to 2004. Each 
observation in the sample satisfies the criteria mentioned in Data Sources and Sample Selection. CAR 
is the cumulative abnormal return for different event windows around the announcement of the 
dividend changes. DC is the percentage change in the cash dividend payment. DY is the dividend yield 
at the time of the announcement of the cash dividend changes. DP is the dividend payout ratio (cash 
dividend per share/ earnings per share). ASSETS is the logarithm of the book value of the total assets at 
the time of the announcement of the cash dividend changes. P/B is the price-to-book ratio at the end of 
the year. DEBT is the debt ratio (book value of total liabilities/ book value of total assets). TATR is the 
total assets turnover rate. ROA is the return on assets. NF is proportion of non-floating shares. The 
F-statistics test the joint hypotheses that both the intercept and the slope coefficients are insignificantly 
different from zero. Finally, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable= CAR 
Variable 
)1,1(−CAR  )1,0(CAR  )3,0(CAR  )5,0(CAR  )10,0(CAR  )20,0(CAR
Intercept -0.0066 (-0.28)  
-0.0151 
(-0.78) 
 
 
-0.0393
(-1.36)  
-0.0424
(-1.18)  
0.0081 
(0.16)  
-0.0383
(-0.53)  
DC 0.0005 (0.55)  
0.0004 
(0.54) 
 
 
0.0014
(1.29)  
0.0016
(1.24)  
0.0016 
(0.87)  
-0.0020 
(-0.75)  
DY 0.2657 (3.15) 
** 
 
0.3353 
(4.79) 
***
 
0.3116
(2.98)
** 
 
0.2195
(1.70)  
0.1655 
(0.91)  
0.2487
(0.96)  
DP 0.0018 (1.36)  
0.0019 
(1.71) 
 
 
0.0018
(1.10)  
0.0030
(1.47)  
0.0016 
(0.54)  
-0.0038
(-0.92)  
ASSETS 0.0003 (0.29)  
0.0006 
(0.65) 
 
 
0.0022
(1.65)  
0.0028
(1.70)  
0.0003 
(0.11)  
0.0029
(0.87)  
PB -0.0005 (-0.79)  
0.0002 
(0.38) 
 
 
-0.0004
(-0.58)  
-0.0006
(-0.69)  
-0.0022 
(-1.72)  
-0.0037
(-2.02)
* 
 
DEBT 0.0056 (0.88)  
0.0040 
(0.76) 
 
 
0.0025
(0.31)  
0.0039
(0.40)  
0.0129 
(0.93)  
0.0028
(0.14)  
TATR -0.0003 (-0.16)  
-0.0013 
(-0.71) 
 
 
-0.0001
(-0.04)  
0.0005
(0.16)  
0.0019 
(0.41)  
0.0029
(0.44)  
ROA 0.0415 (1.19) 
 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.01) 
 
 
0.0609
(1.42)
 
 
0.0755
(1.42)
 
 
0.2044 
(2.71) 
** 
 
0.1636
(1.53)
 
 
NF -0.0103 (-1.33) 
 
 
-0.0062 
(-0.96) 
 
 
-0.0210
(-2.20)
* 
 
-0.0356
(-3.01)
** 
 
-0.0294 
(-1.76) 
 
 
-0.0267
(-1.13)  
F-Test 
(P-Value) 
3.88 
(0.000) 
*** 
 
5.62 
(0.000) 
***
 
5.20
(0.000)
***
 
3.96
(0.000)
***
 
2.78 
(0.003) 
** 
 
2.40
(0.010)
* 
 
Adj. R2 2.86%  4.51%  4.12%  2.94%  1.79%  1.41%  
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
